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.•.... -; . a guerrilla leader and I was a captain in the Army, and we

B:

got together when he was being offered the position of secreta,ry of na,ti_ona.l
defense.

You know, he is not a professional soldier; he wa.s a guerrilla.

lea.der, a,nd he asked me, what will I tell President Quirino?

Well, I told

him, you tell him we a.re going to fight this war in an unconventional wa.y.
Tell him they are making a mistake to think this is a regular war, this isvery different.

And so on, a.nd so on, and so on •.

told President Quirino.

And that is just wha.t he

I said, you tell him we will send all the officers

in the Army headquarters out in the field.

There are so many of them hiding

behind desks, they will a.11 go out in the field.

Tell him that we a.re going

to use dogs, we will use everything that we ca.n think- of.
kind of warfare.

This ;ts a different

He got the job, and when he got the job, I sa,id, now, I

a.m in Ba,ngkok a.s milita.ry atta.chee in Ba.ngkok; so I told him, I a.m going ba,ck
now.

Oh, Lord, you stay with me--I will make you my chief of intelligence.

I sa.id, no, tha_t doesn't sound good--you the secreta,ry and me--no, it doesn't
sound good.

I said, you let me go back to the wa,r a,nd I will pick_ up some
So I went to the war in Vietnam, and

more new ideas a.nd I will let you know.
a.fter tha,t I went to the wa.r in Ma.yla.sia..

I "Eried to find out the experience

of the French, a.nd then the experience of the British ••• well, I got commended,
the secretary, chief of staff, was sending me wires; and then a.11 of a sudden,
you a.re recalled, you come home.

To stay with him and sit down beside him;

my gosh this is going to be a. boring job.
then

r

found out why.

brother-in-la.w,

I like the open, I like the-,,.

He- ha,d one a.ssista.nt, Col. Regal Csp?) who wa.s my

Col. Rega.l Csp?) wa.s another guerrilla. fighter, once a.

professional soldier, but he wa.s more of a poet a,nd a writer tha,n a. soldier,
And his wife a,nd my wife were sisters.

You know, he wa,s Ma,gsa,ys·a.y' s a.ssista.nt
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and I knew why, he wants to leave.

.' .

•.. still secretary of nati_o nal de.fe.nse.?

Background voice:

He was secretary of national defense.

B;

So

t

went ove,r all tlie. pa,pe,i;'s·

o;f ·Mi;i,gsa,ysay.

a,nd then at 7 o'clock in the morni,ng I went in the hous:e

Re knew that I didn't like the joh.

be ;i,n the. f;i,_eld.

r

r

was

I didn't want to he cha.ir-:Oou:nd; I want to

ve-x;y- angry because I was relieved.

after breakfast,

And I: saw

I said, this is· not the way to ;r:un

mounds of papers- on top of the table.
a wa.r with. a.11 thes-e papers

This is terrible..

say, you sign these.

The very fi,r s:t time.,

At first I didn'tt know- tlie trick.,

You know, he was signing, and all of a sudden he would say, ah., tnat is enougli..
I am very, very tired.
table.

Then I lea;rned how to hi.de all the papers under tne~

I put only one paper up.

He never knew how many pape,1:;s he was si:gni::ng.

So in that way after two days he went back to the office. and said, what nappened
to all the. papers on this ta,ble?

I said, you have signed them all.

That is

how we got along, because. he. could not find any more paper after that,
the next two yea.rs we were together. •

For

In short, it was a combination of hi_s-

guerrilla knowledge and my professional knowledge; by that time I was: also a
graduate of Ft. Benning, I was a graduate already of the commander_ _____
school .• •
C:

I:n Ft. Leavenwo:i::th •••

J:

••• in Ft. Leaven1«0:i::th., and I -.:«as a graduate alrea,dy, of the. intelligence
So

school i _n Ft. Wiley (sp?l.
a battalion commander,

r

was

v ery . professional.

And it was a good combinati.on,

didn't believe he wi.1 1 be

a

great man.

But

r

During tne war I was

In the beginning I:

came to pick. up certain

chara,ctecr i .sti.cs: i_n him that we;1:;e really very· genuine, ye:r;y ~incere, a,nd a.long
that t;r:ack, we went along.

------first

a very deep sens-e of justice, a very
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deep sense of justice Cunintelligible) and to the smallest things·.

B:

You ha.ve g-ot to be very si.n cere, not beca,us:e

Second, it is· a.s I saJ_d · s dcnceri ty.

o;f;your political objective, but because that is- how you feel a.bout it.
Third, you are always in a hurry.

Things that we feel should have. been done.

ye.sterda,y, a.re still undone toda,y, and they should ha,-ve. been ;f;in;i:shed 1,ongago.
do not

And fourth is: the personal touch.• · We

Time is a.lways of the essence.

We approach. men, a.s ma,n ta ma,n.

(dogs ba,rking, unintelligi.ble).

exa,mple of someone comes in wanting job; find out more about Fti:m,;

(summary;

try to find job.

Specia.lized attention).

Wha,t else?

I us:ed to tell him he

wa.s subversive of good discipline--beca.use you bypass all the. intervening
layers of command.

You go direct.

You know wha,t he told me?

I sa,id what is your justification · :fo:t; tlia.t?

Emergency,

Csumma,ry;

He said, no, to me, every

judge every case on decis:ions on s;i:mi.lar easel.
ca,se is a new case,

conve.rsa,tion, I studied la,w,

Wha.t can you do with a man who thinks that every case is

Therefore, every case had to be studied in all its angles .

a new ca,se?

There is some.thing good a.bout that, you know.

You know· that is souiething

with. Ma.g-says.a.y, telling me tha,t no, there ;i._s no precedent; every- ca,s-e- is a.
new case.

And I decide a,11 the ca,ses.
di._d you come to meet General La.ns,da.le-?

C:

How

R:

Well, ok., those we;r::e the yec;l.rs· when we were fi:.ghttng ha,rd a,gq,;i:nst

the Huks.
C:

Here come Ed.

Who wa.s the pres;ldent then, Eisenhower?

Yes.

Well, I.ke, na.tura,lly ha,s a deep liki.ng- far Mc;l.g-saysay. Also wheneve:t;
United sta.tes ??
in a, country the;i:;e ;i:_s .t.nsta,hl ;U;i.ty a,nd the. nat;i.ona,l int~ests are- ;L_nvolyed,

B;

na. turall y the U •;,, will look for the strong- ma,n.

Right?

And ;i:_f tlie. strong

ma.n happens to fit the description of that ideal :ma.n, the. bette;r.
back up that man--right?

They wt.11

And so here came in Magsaysay and this· .t.s just like-
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the man.

B;

the ·man.

You know, from ever ything that you hear a,bout him, he i s-

And the. Arrler;i'.ca,n way ;Ls naturally, I will give you support.

there is no l ;i:..m:;tt ta that support,

And the fellow bel;Leves also i.n tiie

ca,us-e of that ma,n, a,nd the. two are identifiable.
Huks.

And so the two ca.me to like each other.

humble, with. lots of initiative, new ideas.
like Magsaysay right away.

And

The. fight against the
Ed was softspoken, very

Somebody who wa,s very much_

When Ed came in, I don't knowwnethe.r he was

attached to MAAG right away, psychological warfare or something.

I said

to :Magsaysay, what is the difference, adviser of what or what, so long as
h.e. is there, then us will progress.

Us will face more problems, we became

more and more dependent on the man who can give us ideas and support,
so the meetings become more frequent.

They have their own safe hous-es: where

to meet, and the two became so intimate.

And you know, Magsaysay he. is· so

st.m ple; he does not have the trappings of a potentate..
simple farmer .

And

He wants to be a,

And that I s how the two came to li.k e ea,ch other.

They nave

similar ta,stes; one ;ts innovative, the other one is very recepti.ve.
other one i .s brave a,nd wi lling to take. the ri.sk.

Tiie.

I can see quickly when

one gives him a formula, he picks ;lt up quickly, a,nd off they go,
ideal;ism ,

The
trai.ned
l was not very much involved with them , because we were/ in the

Army not to indulge in polit:ics.
time.

We were not even allowed to vote at that

we were strictly neutral, when it comes to poli.tics·,

no love for politics,

My father was a congressman,

I myself ha,ve

My father forcedme to

transfer from engineering to law, thinking that l would follow his· footsteps.
(summary:

lea,der in high school).

So when Magsaysay was hav ing these things

wi .th. Ed, I would not bather--I stayed to my job,
Ed a.nd me got close in Vietnam, after we are through the. H11k.s tlie~e .

Ta,pe i
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B:

There was the Dien Bien Phu, was being fought.

the Geneva. Conference

:r

went ther e., hec a.uae

(summary: 77going ta Geneva, didn't kno w wha,t fui,ppen;til.g

in Indochina, so I was sent.

French_·

No diplomatic relati.ans with- Vietnam.

really running whole show, ) went as observer, supposed to sta.y only for 3 rnontns·,
but developed on into 5 years, because 4 months later on, Ed arrived,

:r

when Ed arrived he said, Joe, will you give me a brie-fing?
a.nd he said, wait awh_ile.

gave

And

fiim nriefing,

I will take notes, and that became. 3 hour bri efings:

because we discus·sed what we should do the next 2 y~rs.

At that time. ;r could

see the future, uncanny feeling :i: could see what was· coming,

So I. told him what

we have to do in I.ndochina, that ;ts government of the people, · by the people.

and for the people in order to be viable.

At that time the. Vi.e.tnamese were.

hold;i:ng only 4 ministries, and the bulk of the mini.stries were being Iie.ld D;{'
the French.

How can you call this a Vietnamese government?

fooling yourself.

The French. are behind the whole thing.

Y:ou · are just
Dien Bien Pfiuwas

being fought and the:t;'e was the poss;i:.bility of the French getting defeated ,
and we had to start a new pol;Lticc).l order.

Na. turally we stq,rt thinkiJ.1.g, a,nd

so I told him, where to make the independence o:f; the V;i:.etnames.e real ana that
means the. French has to get out.
acceptable to the French. (summary:

Of course, that was, at tnat time. not too
French holding on to thei.r powers to end.

said must strive for new constitution, and Asian h :r;:others called in to help;
:!;ind way for Vietnamese to express through. ballot; establish- a government;
foremost will be sec urity.

Also I told him of; Philippine hi.story ; how-

Amer;tcans establ i shed government here; MacArthur was he.r e-; s.t arted on politicaJ
reforms·,

Everything still has to be militarily defended,.

model in Vietnam, I said. L

Phi.l i pp;i:ne can be

Under tha,t f;irst pla,nn;tng we took up helping the.

government achieve s:ome kind of stability with a better interior fo r ce, not
a fighting army, but the interior force.

We sent Vietnamese in big groups here

r

Ta,pe, l
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B:

to study.

C:

Regional Force ...

B:

So the thing is that I said that from my government you know we are

And we organized in Vietnam RFP, .•

a small country, don't have much to give, but we ca.n assist.

And I said to

my mi.nd, the place where we can assist and not get into the line of fire of
the French is in the medical field.

I told Ed that perhaps we could help in

the alleviation of the problems ;i.n Vietnam at that ti.m e by sending ,medical
teams . in Vietnam.

we implemented that not only there but ;ln Laos.

Then, of

course, we had a successful year in the Philipp;i.nes in what we called the
civic actions, the approach to the people.

I said that since the United

States forces that might be involved in Vietnam will need assistance in some
way, in a technical way, then we. have to get the techn;i._cians from the
Philippines.
£:rom scratch.

That became the proposal for the Freedom Company.
Ed, myself,

embassy, ;i.t was a legat;i.on.
med;i.cal teams to come in.

We started

The. American embassy was at that time Wc\S not an
And so for me my immediate propos:al was for
It is a starting point,

It i .s humanitarian, so

the French could not say, you are intervening, interfe;r:-ing,

French_ difficult;

would not allow Vietnamese to go out ... you know, I went to Vi.etna,m prior to
tha.t for one week, in November 1950, and on November 11, that is the Armistice
Day, I was invited to the. house of the American minister to celebra,te Armi.st;lce
Day.

I met the chief of the USJS .

play ;i.n Vietna.m?

I was asked on wha,t role can the Philippines

(material omitted--sa,t beside an Ame-rican on a. pla,ne.

can Phil;i.ppi,n es and Vietnamese get along?

How

Mi.ni.ster, dentist, boyscouts got out

of Sa;i.gon, came to Philippines . ) :Cn Vietnam you never present a project as:
your project, but as a Vietna,mese project.

That's how-we pushed through- all

of our pro9ra,ni$ in vtetnam, as a Vietnamese project .

Cmateri_a,1 omi,tted:

a,- · Fi.l;i.pino

Ta.pe

J_ -

said he knew author of a project is Banzon; Banzon told him to shut

B:
up.1
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So everything is tn the. name of the Vletnamese.
You sai.d you stayed in SaJgon 4 years·, .• What was your position tne;t:,'e,'?

C:

5 years. First as a military observer, and later on r had to work
recognition
-.,
?•
for the 11\3::B~:i:efi/of Vietnam by the Philippines. It was: an issue i .n the

B:

There were pol;i.ticia.ns who were figh_ti,ng Magsays·ay agains·t tne
recognition
to the g0vernment of Vie:tnaro. But once.Philippine government extending · /
opened
we. had been able to extend recognition, we e:19efta diplomatic relations.
Philippines.

C;

When was· that done?

B;

Later part of '56, I think.

And I was the first military attachee.

I got Magsaysay to sign the papers one evening when we went out driving, and
when we come back, I said, you sign.

Magsaysay:

too much opposition.

conversation about signing, not signing).

(omitted:

He signed it,

Bo wanted to get the papers and fly lt himself,
then I run back to Vi.etna.m.

(omitted:
you.

I say have to change to my barong.

know why the president was in .a hurry?

we

said, no.

Everybody say hurry, waiting for
Went to palace, pres.·s there. l

You

Tha.t day was the a.nni:vel;'sa,ry of tfie.

_____of Vietnam, and early in the morning there was a faig mob, sacked tlie
Majestic Hotel (American socialite there, omitted).

And the president wanted

a counter on that very day to show the world there is one country· that recogniz~
them.

It was a long story.

C:

In what ways did you work with General Lansdale during those 4 years?

B:

We did it together.

First, you know, I have no logistics whatsoever .

Meaning, I can give you ideas but that's all.
role is thi.s:
Vietnamese.

It is run by itself.

I know more of the Asian psychology.

I am an Asian,

Somy
I know tI:ie

The American is suspect by the Vietnamese; this is why from the

Ta,pe l
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B:

shoes: of the French, you see.

a.nothe;1; thJng; a brother.
-Vi..etnames-e.

Somebody

That's our role.

who puts the Arner;t_can closer to the

And so when I call all my re.latives to go to

Vietnam to start Operation Brotherhood.
godfather.

But when it is a Filipino who, it is

Oscar Arrellano, his- father was: my-

And Oscar Arrellano went to Saigon w;tth Monching

is now ambassador to Canada.

These two went there and they sa.id, we a,re

Ering:tng ·medicines- :for a. cl;tnic.

And then Dr. Wong (sp?l,

a.

Chinese doctor

who ;ts a very civic spirited man was the one with. the JC' r;,,

So they ta,lRed

of having more substantial assistance through the JC's of Sa,igon by medic1ne,
l sa,id, you don't go i _nto this retail business-.

Let I s go i _nto wholesale,

r

sa,id, do you not know tha,t Vietnam i _s gett;i,ng divided, and the.re will be an
exodus of thour;:;a.nds of people from the north, and these people all wi:11 need
medica.l attention and somebody to attend to them.
giving medicine). •

And that is: we (summa,ry;

So the JC of the Philippines bough± it, but the mayor of

Manila hated and the pape:t:'s of Manila were also hitting us, why we · generous ta tha,t
sort of people, be generous to our own.

Anyway, the first group arrived.

The

U • s. emba.i,tsy will not believe- me when I say I need visa for 7 people._ Yes,
7 people..

Ok, issue visa; U oS. embassy arranged visa.

Opera.tion Brotherhood.

That is how we started

Now this is a medical operati_o n, supposed to be from

people to people, actually can never get off the ground by itself.
medi_cines would not go far, but that's how we started in Vietnam.

Our own
We re.a lly

want this, becaus.e i _t w;i,11 force the Vietna,mese to do it themselves-,
half
Now, we. sta,rted S-mi'l,11, r;:;ma,11, sma.11, but then this whole/peninsula
wa,s dumped into the hands of the :Republic of Vie.tnam.
south. you know occupied by the Vietnamese
them .;tntq mob.tle te9,,ms.

This, is the whole.

(materi.al omitted). .

I organized

Ed was with. me a,lrea,dy, i3,nd Ed understa,nds the
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whole. thing.

B:

And so Bo is here and Bo i .s the Manila manager, you

know·; what -we as.k, Bo produces.

,A.nd they s:ta.rt coming from the plane d;trect

to Ca,ma,u o.ecause we were. going to take over Camau at midnight, and tfie.y arrived
in the afternoon and we have enough time only to go from the airport to go ta
the Peninsula? of Camau, and on midnight, take over.
The Viet Cong was already there,

That was very· dra,matlc ,

When we ..•

(pa.use on ta,pel
.• , send the medicine by air, a.tr drop, and sa,ve the person, things
like tha,t, every day.
now.

Say this is your government, this· is your own government
The chief of staff, he- went there.

PreS'ident D.tem, he went there.
(summary:

a,11 by canal.

I got pass from Viet Minh, and entered at_ _, no roads,

Officer there surrounded by Vietnarnes-e, his name is Due (?L

Due say shout across every night; contest in psychologi,c aJ warfare •• , 1

END OF TAPE ..1

TAPE 2

B;

•• , we met hi.m on the street i.n Sa.;i.gon.

When ha see me he wi:11 g:i;ca,h

me and embrace. me and -cry and cry in the middle of the street • •
¥au know·, there a.re people who wi.11 say tha. t the. Vietnamese cannot he.
trusted; it ;i.s not always true.

:C ha.ye "Vietni;\f(\6.$;e. f):;tends who s•tood fa,st W'ith_
' '

us through_ thick a,nd thin up to the end.

Ed himself: h 9 d- his very close friends,

Vietnamese,
C:

Why do you think ;!.t wa,s tha,t La.nsdale, an Americ 9 n, w~s ~hle. tq "\'.Ork

so well with F;Uipinos and Vietna.lT\ese?

Tape 2. - Interview-wJth Jose. Ba,nzon i:l,t Bohannan is:, Manila, R,epublic of the
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B:

Because Ed knows the psycholog y.

Second, Ed is very sincere,

not do it for anything else but for sincerity .

Ed, he opens his- heart.

misunders tood, all these people--t hey don't know Ed.
very warm.

He does
He i.s-'

He is· a p erson that i _s

He is not one of those who will pretend to be your f'.riend for

ulterior motives---no,
Magsaysay also,

He is so straight, you see,

,And this- was true

of

Very simple, simple tastes; very· human, down to earth ,

airs, no ai.r of nothing,

No

It is like monks, like monks:, you know, -One tiil)e_

Ma,gsaysay pulled me in the plane beca,use I: ha,d so ,ma,ny pa,pers for him. to sign ,
We landed in Calgayan (phonetic ? ) and he was wearing a s·tra,w- hat and the people
there were laughing.

Mr. Secretary , why a,re you wearing that hat? (summary;

he rec,;tted poem, about poor a,nd simple, etc.

I a,lmost crie,d listening to him . }

ds,y. before he died I with wi.th him; he. sai_d why 2\:t'e you hr.;tnging President Diem?
He. told me he just wants to wa,lk with you in the beach.
said, ok, we will walk in the beach at Barong (sp?).
he died,

President Mags-a ysay

,And then the next day,

Of course I flew the next day--the President was walking back and forth__

in the. palace, always calling me, was there any news.
like monks, you know.

Two people who were also

President Diem mourned President Magsaysay ,

You know during the war against the Viet Minh, Ed mus·t have told you,
in the. mountain of Neubaodin (phonetic ), that is the black lady mountain, there:
was a Vi,etnames e general by the name of Trinh Minh The (7)_ who was a very, very
close friend of Ed's,

we used to air drop ai_d to Trinh. M;Lnh_ The, and Trinh

Minh The and me came to know each other, and he di,s another very simple man .
,And all he wanted was to see Magsaysay , and I arri3.nged i_t, for him to come- here
a,nd meet the Pres'ident , but then there wa,s th;Ls uprising i_ns:ide Saigon a,nd
Trinh Minh_ The, you know, led,,.you know, what the French_we re doing was

Ta,pe 2
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helping the. rebels and trying to prevent them from being cut off

B:

from the rear.

And Tr.;inh Minh The. led his forces across the'. river, on the

br.;Ldge, he. was shot.

President Ngo Dinh Diem cried.

He died.

Ed was·

(unintelligible)
As I sai,d , a ver:y since.re man .

This charm of Ed's, very sincere,

Let me ask you .o ne more question, sir.

C:

I didn I t qui,te understand

your relationship with Louis:e (?) Magsaysay.
B:

Louise ;is my cousirt. ,

C:

I thought you were her brother.

B:

No, no.

She was not my brother.

Banzon, the same as. my name..

Lou;t.s Ma.gsays'i':l,y;'· s -.-fa.the;r; i .s Jose

And her sister was my cla.s·smate in lil.gh. school;

we. are distant cousins.
C:

Not even first cousins?

B;: ·

Not even first cousi.ns.

But when I flrst sta;i;ted Ma.gsa.ysay thouglit

I was very ·close to her and he picks me out (unintelligible.l · but later on so , ••
$0 the li.fe of Magsaysay and the life of Ed, you know, they have

common ideals.
Ed asked me one time., di.d we do wrong in Vi.e:tna.m?

J: Si'l.i.d , no .

I said,

if we did not do wha.t we did i.n Vietnam, it would not have lasted that long .
Because in 1950 af;'ter the fall of;' Dien Blen Phu, the. people were demoralized;
the people were selling their houses; everybody was mov;t,ng to Europe, to 'France .
You can buy cars very, very cheap.

Just a matter of;' t;Lme before the Viet Minh

That was the time when we came in. And that is the time when
work.?
7 so ha.rd, Ed will wa,lk so ha.rd until you can see his: eyes are twitching ,
we.
worked?
He walked s o hard. ;r::t was not so easy to make a people make a stand, a people
will take over,

~g,I~H

who feel defea,ted a,lread:'(; 'l!la,ke.
is some ki.nd of hope.

a.

sta,nd.

The, f;i::rst thing we ha.ve to give th.eni

At tha,t t;Lme there. was a government but the. inin.ister$·

.'

I
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Go to the-ir hous:es-, in tnei_r

do not wa.nt even to go to office .

B:

a questio n of
pajama s, d r ags them out; we have got a job to do. It was just
time.

That is,

r

think, · the bigges t contrib ution of Ed; it could have. ended
You see from the. period of Dien Bi en

ver;y much earlie r, thi.s fall of Vietnam .
Phu when everyth ing is ~zero, up, up up,

We at least ha.d an Army thl'l,t fough.t ,

We had a governm ent that at times knew what it was doing ,

His brothe r--r told him,

was all right until he became a little hardhea ded,
ear;ly to get rid of his: brothe r.

Presid ent Di.em

And we went ;ln a celeb:r- ati'on in the. Del ta .

we went
After that he took anothe r pla,ne, and we flew to a coasta l town,
aboard a ship.

That's the fi.r :st time he went on board a ship in Vietnam .

anti-a ircraft
I was laughin g because there is no salutin g gun; we had only an
gun, and we fired the gun up.

We were laughin g,

Salute dtiiePr esi.den t.

In the evening I was. the only one (uninte ll;i.gih lel .
Yes .

read what some directo r i .s telling a.bout you?
(summa ry:

better read.

The. preside nt liked to
l: work- for newspa per

Then d;Ldn't want to go o n in war.

called him so and so and so).

Then I told him:

F±lippi ne sena,to r

Mr . Presid ent, do you know

one Philipp ine preside nt lost hi.s off ice be.ca.us e. of a brothe r .

Preside nt

e. of a,
Quirino lost an electio n beca,us e of a, brothe r, Tony Qui.r i no, be.caus
scanda l.

I sai.d, why don't ~you remove Ngo Dinh_ Nuh?

C:

What was his respons e?

B:

Do you know what hi.s respons e was.?

to talk. to me.

He grow very red , and he refuse

Later on, yea:r:s later on, you know I left ,

:C went to rndone si'a,

ded by
a,nd my· f:t;iends told me, get back, get back; the preside nt is· surroun
people who are very bad.

It is too late.

He s aJ ,d, some people are saying

and everythi ng
things aoout my ~othe r, but all that my brothe;r: does, · I know,
tha,t my b r other doe.s , I approv e ,

I sai d, tha,t ~s the end,

The- brothe r is toe.

•

I
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B:

one that took down Ngo Dinh Diem.

Ma.da;m Nhu a,nd Mr . Nhu.

Pres;i:;dent

Ngo D;t.nh. Diem, I don't know--somet imes the Vi.etnamese do not want to be. told,
you know.

But if he removed Ngo Dinh Nhu at tha;t time and he went straight,

ma,yhe tha;t could have helped him.

Not entirely, but help him.

C:

Well, Mr. Banzon, J have taken up a;n a,wful lot of your time • ••

B:

So many things, you know . ..
I think another aspect of Ed's I he had to fight fellow A.me.r icans,
Members of the

you know, in the Embassy.

usrs,

chief of

and the political advisers, and so on and so on,

us.rs,

the ,milita;ry,

Many times he comes out a.nd

tells us.
One thing good, Ed's support of his colle.a ;gues .
support.

He wa;s so well respected.

ti:me, Ha,bib was there a;lso,

Porter.

He got a, lot of

Westmorela,n d listens, to him .

At the

Who Wc\S • • ,A.meri,can i:1,mba;ssador, ,, •

HCL--llenry Cc\bot Lodge.

C:

Sulphurt,c c\Cid.

B:

Not Abrams .•• among the ambassadors . • .

C:

Oh, Taylor.

Comi.tted a;bout HCLL

Taylor had a ha.rd time.

we could have ended the fighting earli.er.

Y:ou know wh-Y?

The.
~~-

general Wc\nted to surrender to us, just only·..• the p:i:::•ope,r conditions-•• •

JNTERVIEW ENDS

Abrams,

Jose Banzon interview, 30 July 1985

wHh

:r:

~ t - s p o k e n v e r ~ humblP.
ef initaLi'i1e, new j deas .
They [ E ~ ]
. . . . ~ simpl L..- ~ ~ he wanled ce ~ farmer.
have simi--l-ar tasle5i0ne is innovative, Etre ocher one is ver y r ~_,.
Ed and me got close in VN.
I went as observer, supposed to stay only
for 3 months, but developed on into 5 yes, because Ed arrived.
He said,
Joe, will you give me a briefing?
I did.
At that time the VNese were holding only 4 ministries and the bulk of
the ministries were being held by the French.
How can you call this a
VNese govt?

